Generalized Hoare Logic is a formal logical system for deriving invariance properties of programs. It provides a uniform way to describe a variety of methods for reasoning about concurrent programs, including noninterference, satisfaction, and cooperation proofs. We describe a simple recta-rule of the Generalized Hoare Logic--the Decomposition Principle--and show how all these methods can be derived using it.
INTRODUCTION
A variety of methods have been proposed for reasoning about concurrent programs. Most of these are for proving safety properties--properties asserting that the program never enters an unacceptable state. Some methods deal with concurrent programs that use shared variables [2, 4, 11, 12, 16, 18] ; more recently, the absence of shared variables in CSP [10] has led to other techniques for reasoning about such programs [1, 5, 15, 19] . This diversity of methods has obscured the fact that there is really a simple principle involved in all of them: proving the invariance of an assertion.
The Generalized Hoare Logic (GHL) [13] , a formal logical system for deriving invariance properties of programs from the properties of their components,
• L. Lamport and F. B. Schneider provides a uniform way to describe these other assertional methods for reasoning about concurrent programs. This allows a comparison of the methods, which can help in understanding them. GHL is a generalization of the programming logic proposed by Hoare [9] for reasoning about sequential programs. In Hoare's logic, one views a program as a partial correctness relation between two predicates, a precondition and a postcondition, meaning that if the program is started in a state that satisfies the precondition and it terminates, then the final state satisfies the postcondition. Using the logic, one derives partial correctness properties of sequential programs from properties of their components. This provides an elegant formulation of Floyd's method [8] for pro~ing the correctness of a program. Although one must still perform the same basic verification steps, by providing a new way of viewing programs, Hoare's approach has led to improved ways for specifying and constructing programs, such as Dijkstra's programming calculus [7] .
In the same vein, GHL can be viewed as another formulation of the methods for reasoning about concurrent programs. It leads to a new way of viewing a concurrent program--as maintaining the invariance of a predicate. This, in turn, has led to new specification methods for concurrent programs [14] , and we hope it will lead to improved techniques for constructing concurrent programs.
Using invariance to reason about concurrent programs is not new, having been proposed by Ashcroft [2] and Keller [11] . What GHL does is provide a logic for deriving invariance properties of a program. In this paper, we show how various techniques for establishing safety properties of concurrent programs can be formulated in GHL in terms of invariance. Section 2 contains an overview of GHL and its principles; Section 3 applies the principles to some popular proof systems.
PROVING SAFETY PROPERTIES WITH GHL

Atomic Actions
During execution of a program, there will be times when the system is in undefined or pathological states. For example, when the contents of a bit of memory is changed, it will pass through an intermediate state in which its value is neither zero nor one. Since a safety property asserts that a predicate is always true, it is unlikely to hold if such a transient intermediate state were visible. We therefore assume the existence of atomic actions, which transform the system from one state to another without passing through any visible intermediate states. An operation whose execution is atomic will be enclosed in angle brackets.
The notion of an atomic operation is irrelevant for sequential programs. However, to specify a concurrent program, one must specify which operations are atomic. To see this, consider the following two programs z and p: Execution of 7r consists of two atomic actions, each incrementing x by one. Hence, the program will terminate with x two greater than its initial value. Execution of p consists of four atomic actions: two that fetch the value of x and increment it, and two that store a value in x. If both fetches precede both stores, then p will
The "Hoare Logic" of CSP, and All That We place no restrictions on what can appear inside angle brackets, thereby allowing a complicated statement or sequence of statements to be atomic. This allows one to write atomic operations that need not terminate, raising the question of how a nonterminating atomic action can he executed, since, being atomic, it cannot he interrupted before completion. We answer this by requiring that an atomic operation not be executed unless it will terminate. Conditionally terminating atomic operations can then be used to represent synchronization primitives. For example, a P(s) semaphore operation can be represented by ~ (s :--s -1; while s < 0 do skip od).
We do not advocate allowing a programmer to put anything inside angle brackets; that would be impossible to implement. We are simply observing that nothing has to be added to GHL in order to reason about the synchronization primitives provided by concurrent programming languages, since these primitives can be represented as conditionally terminating atomic operations.
Proving Safety Properties
A safety property has the following form, for some predicates Init 
Formulas of GHL have the form {z} {i} where I is a predicate and 7r a program fragment. This formula means that executing any atomic action in r starting in a state in which I is true leaves I true. A simple induction argument shows that if v is the entire program, then this is equivalent to $2; so {I} v {I} means that I is an invariant of ~r. In [13] , GHL is described for a simple programming language. An inference rule for each language construct is given, enabling invariance properties of statements to be derived from invariance properties of their components. All these inference rules are based on the following principle: In this paper, we use the Decomposition Principle to derive inference rules for some programming constructs not considered in [13] .
To describe how GHL is used, we shall also require some inference rules from [13] that apply to all programming constructs. The first rule allows invariance properties of the same program fragment to be combined. In light of the meaning of {I} ~r {I}, it is obviously valid.
Conjunction Rule:
As mentioned earlier, the state of the system must include control information. GHL uses the following predicates to describe the control state:
at(v)
--"control resides at an entry point of v".
in(v)
-"control resides somewhere in v, including at its entry point".
after(v) = "control resides at a point immediately following 7r".
In GHL the definition of a language construct includes a specification of its at, in, and after predicates, which serve to define its control flow semantics.
We define {P} v {Q} to be an abbreviation for 4
If v is an atomic operation, then {P} v {Q} means that executing v starting in a state in which P holds produces a state in which Q is true. (Recall that an atomic operation v cannot be executed unless it will terminate.) When v is, in addition, a complete statement, this is the same meaning as in Hoare's programming logic. '
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For a program fragment r that might not be atomic, {P} ~r {Q} means that if control is anywhere inside 7r and P holds, then executing the next atomic operation in r will either (1) leave control in r with P true, or (2) leave control at an exit point of r with Q true. If 7r is atomic, then there is only one control point inside ~r--the one at its entry point.
The only other GHL inference rule we need follows from the observation that it is possible to execute an atomic operation 7r only if in(Tr) is true, and that control is at an exit point of 7r only if after(r) is true.
Locality Rule:
The Locality Rule can be derived from P2 and P3 of [13] . Note that from the definition of {P} r {Q}, it follows immediately that {in(
FORMULATIONS IN GHL
We turn now to some specific methods for proving programs and show how they can be formulated in GHL. These methods are for proving one specific safety property: partial correctness. Partial correctness of program r with respect to precondition P and postcondition Q is an instance of SP with the predicates Init: at(~r) h P .
Etern: after(v) ~ Q.
Note that because we do not assume any preferred starting point, we have to include the conjunct at(v) in Init to specify that the program is started at the beginning.
Floyd's Method Revisited
Floyd's method [8] uses the flowchart representation of the program. The program's flowchart consists of a set of nodes connected by directed arcs. The nodes represent program fragments; the arcs represent control flow. There is an arc from node r to node ~b if the entry point of ~b is an exit point of ~. For example, consider Figure 1 , where boxes are labeled 7rl -~3 and control points are labeled al-a4. The node r2 corresponds to a conditional test. It has two exit points, a3 and a4, the former being the entry point of 7r~ and the latter the exit point of the entire program. Which one is reached depends on the outcome of the test. Note also that a2 is the exit point of both ~1 and ~r3, as well as the entry point of 7r2. In Floyd's method, partial correctness with respect to a precondition P and a postcondition Q is proved by associating a predicate with each control point. P is associated with the entry point, Q is associated with the exit point, and the predicates associated with the other control points are chosen so that the This implies that if the program is started at its entry point with the precondition P true and it reaches its exit point, then its final state satisfies the postcondition Q. To prove A/, it is necessary to prove the following verification condition for each box ~i:
VC: If ri is executed starting in a state that satisfies the predicate associated with its entry point, then the predicate associated with the control point it reaches after its execution will be true.
A simple induction argument shows that the truth of VC for every box 7r~ implies the truth of AI. This reduces the problem of proving partial correctness to proving a verification condition for each box. Floyd gave simple rules for proving these verification conditions. Figure 1 illustrates the use of Floyd's method to prove a partial correctness condition for a simple program that sums the first n elements of a one-dimensional array b and leaves the result in s. Our goal is to prove that if execution is begun with n -0, then it can terminate only with s = ~,inl b [j] . In the figure, the predicate associated with each control point a~ is labeled P~; the precondition n _ 0 is associated with control point al and the postcondition s -~i%1 b[j] with a4. There are three verifications conditions--one for each box--which are easily checked. For example, the verification condition for 7r2 asserts that if testing i = n with P2 true yields false, then P3 must hold, and if it yields true then P4 must • L. Lamport and F. B. Schneider hold. This verification condition follows immediately from the definitions of P2, P:~, and P4. Using the program z of Figure 1 , we now illustrate that the Floyd method is an instance of the use of GHL to prove a safety property, in which AI is the invariant I of S1-$3.
To apply GHL, a program's atomic operations must be specified. For a program represented by a flowchart, we assume that each box is an atomic operation. Let pc be the control state, so pc = ai means that the program is at control point ai.
Since for program z of Figure 1 Since z2 is atomic, this formula means that if executing the test z2 moves control to a3 (the "false" exit) then P3 must hold, and if control moves to a4 (the "true" exit) then P4 must hold. Recall that this is just the verification condition for box z2 in the Floyd method. Therefore, proving {AI} z2 {AI} is equivalent to establishing the verification condition for box ~r2. Similarly, proving {AI} ~r~ {AI} and {AI} ~r3 {AI} are equivalent to establishing the verification conditions for boxes zl and z3. These three verification conditions can be proved formally in GHL using the axioms and inference rules in [13] . In this way, a proof by the Floyd method of the partial correctness of any program z with respect to precondition P and postcondition Q can be expressed in GHL. The GHL proof ultimately requires proving the same verification conditions as the Floyd method. We expect that every assertional method for reasoning about a program will reduce to proving these same verification conditions. However, this should not be surprising--it is the verification conditions that capture the semantics of the program.
The Owicki-Gries Method Reviewed
The Owicki-Gries method is a way of proving partial correctness for a concurrent program ~r of the form where the processes 7rh communicate only by using shared memory [18] . Partial correctness of ~r with respect to a precondition P and a postcondition Q is proved in two steps.
(1) It is proved for each process rk in isolation.
(2) These proofs are combined by establishing noninterference--execution of one process does not invalidate assertions in the proof of another.
Such a proof can be formulated in GHL as follows. The partial correctness proof for each process 7rk in step (1) We assume that at the entry point of 7r, control is at the entry points of all the ~rk; and control reaches the exit of ~r when it is at the exits of all the ~rk. 6 This means that
at(Tr) = at(Trl) A ... A atOrn) after(it) -after(IrO A ... A after(Trn).
From these relations, and the fact that (3. For k = i, this is just (3.2.2). For k ~ i, (3.2.8) states that execution of ~rk does not invalidate assertions in the proof of 7ri, which is exactly the noninterference condition proved in step (2) of the Owicki-Gries method. This completes our formulation of the Owicki-Gries method in GHL.
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Again, the GHL proof involves the same verification conditions as the OwickiGries method. However, we feel that invariance is clearer than noninterference of proofs, so formulating a proof in GHL makes it easier to understand. Also, unlike the Owicki-Gries method, synchronization primitives do not require special proof rules in GHL. This is because they are represented by conditionally terminating atomic operations, so Floyd's method handles them quite easily.
CSP Reexplained
CSP [10] is intended for describing distributed programs. A CSP program ~ has the form
where each 7ri is a sequential process. Processes synchronize and communicate by using synchronous input and output commands. For notational simplicity, we consider a variant of CSP in which communication commands reference channels instead of other processes. Thus, to model CSP as described by Hoare, two unidirectional channels ~ij and ~ji connect each pair of processes ~ri and 7rj. Channel ~ij can be named only in output commands in 7ri and input commands in 7rj. For a channel ~, an expression expr, and a variable var, execution of the output command s: ~!expr by some process causes it to be delayed until some other process executes a matching input command r: f~ ? var.
The two commands are executed simultaneously as a single atomic action, causing the value of expr to be assigned to var. Thus, this matching pair of communications commands can be viewed as the "decentralized" atomic assignment statement ( var := expr), which we label r *--~ s. Communication commands can occur as free-standing Statements or in the guards of guarded commands.
There are two types of guarded commands in CSP: the alternative command and the repetitive command. Here, we consider only the repetitive command; treatment of alternative commands is similar. The syntax of a repetitive command rpt is rpt:
The command rpt contains an atomic operation gevalrpt that can perform the following action:
if control is at the entry point of rpt, then (a) if the value of some Gi is true, then it moves control to the entry point of Ci; (b) if the values of all the Gi are false, then it moves control to the exit point of rpt.
If more than one Gi has the value true, then the choice of i in (a) is nondeterministic.
A Boolean guard Gi consists of a Boolean expression, and its value is defined to be the value of that expression. If all the G~ are Boolean guards, then rpt is the same as Dijkstra's do statement [7] . However, we also allow communication guards of the form
Bi ; commi
where Bi is a Boolean expression and commi is a communication command. 7 The value of this guard is defined to equal false if B~ is false, and maybe if Bi is true. Thus, geval~p~ cannot be executed if some guards have the value maybe and all the rest have the value false. A communication guard Gi whose value is maybe may be executed by executing its communication command commi, causing control to move to the beginning of statement C~. Of course, this requires simultaneously executing a matching communication command in another process.
In GHL, an invariance property {I} 7r {I} for a CSP program r is proved as follows. We regard each channel ~ as a program fragment. The atomic operations of ~ consist of all operations r *--~ s for matching communication commands s and r using channel ~. Observe that ~[~r], the set of atomic operations of ~, is given by
for processes ~i -7r. and channels ~i -~m. We partition ~ into two parts, 7r pr and 7r ch with The program fragment 7r p" represents the concurrent program ~ without any communication over channels--that is, where processes can communicate only using shared variables. (The use of shared variables is prohibited in CSP, but that makes no difference in this discussion.) Therefore, (3.3.1) can be verified by using ordinary methods, such as the Owicki-Gries method. In r p~, there are no atomic operations corresponding to communication commands ("!" and "?"). The operations that perform channel communications are in ~h. In proving (3.3.1), these operations can be regarded as "halts"--when control reaches the entry point of such an operation, no further progress is possible. This explains the "strange and astonishing" rules A1 and A2' of [1] , the "miraculous" Receive Axiom of [19] , and the corresponding Communication Axiom in [15] .
To prove (3.3.1), we apply the Decomposition Principle to ~PL In doing this, we decompose a repetitive command rpt as follows.
a[rpt] -a[gevalrptl u a[C1] tJ ... U a[Cn].
To prove that rpt leaves I invariant, the Decomposition Principle requires that we prove {I} C1 {I}, ..., {I} Cn {I}, and {I} gevalrpt {I}. We already know how to prove {I} Ci {I}. To prove {I} gevaLpt {I}, we use the following GHL proof rules, where the term pure predicate refers to a predicate that does not contain references to at, in or after.
--If P is a pure predicate then {P} gevalr~t {P}.
--{true} gevaL~t {(3i: Gi = true A at(Ci)) V (Vi: Gi = false A after(rpt))}.
The first proof rule states that evaluating the guards does not change the value of any program variable. The second proof rule is just a formal description of the operational semantics of the repetitive guarded command that was given above. Note that maybe's do not appear there because control passes a communication guard only by an action of a channel, not by an action of gevalr~t.
To apply the Locality Rule for a repetitive command rpt, we must also know the following relations among the at, in, and after predicates of its components.
at(rpt) = at(gevalrpt) after(gevalr~t) ~ at(C1) V at(C2) V ... V after(rpt) after(Ci) =-at(gevalrpt).
The last rule says that the command iterates. To prove (3.3.2), we apply the Decomposition Principle to 7r oh, which requires proving {I} ~j {I} 
4). To do this, we must understand the meaning of in(r ~--~ s) and after(r ,~--~ s).
For an atomic operation p, in(p) means that the control state is such that p could be the next operation executed. Similarly, after(p) means that the control state is such that p could have been the last operation executed. For free-standing communication commands r and s, the operation r *--} s can be executed only when control is at the entry point of both r and s, and its execution moves control to the exit points of r and s. Therefore,
in(r ~--~ s) ~ at(r) A at(s) after(r ~--~ s) = after(r) A after(s),
and we can apply the Locality Rule to {3. These are the verification conditions for channel communications. They correspond to the cooperation proof in [1] , the satisfaction proof and condition (3.4.2) in [15] , and the similar conditions in [19] . The formal proof of (3.3.5) in GHL uses axioms and inference rules given in [13] , where the operation r <--~ s is treated as the simple atomic assignment < var := expr).
On the basis of the semantics given thus far, a repetitive command will terminate only when all Booleans in its guards are false. In Hoare's CSP, there is a weaker condition for termination, namely, that every guard is either false or names a channel connected to a process that has terminated. To capture this, we simply define the value of the guard To illustrate this approach to CSP, consider the following trivial program, which sets variable u to the value of variable x. Our goal is to prove that if execution is started at the beginning of ~, 7r2, and 7r3 then it can terminate only with u = x. We choose Formula (3.3.6) is obviously true because ~1 contains no atomic actions--the communications action is considered to be part of channel ~12. The proof of formula (3.3.7) follows because the only action in v2 is gevalrpt. Executing gevalrpt does not change the value of x, y, or u. Thus, x = y and y = u are not changed by ~r2. The GHL proof rule for cobegin (rule P3(d) of [13] ) states that no action in one process can affect the value of at, in, and after for other processes. Hence, the antecedents of the implications in I are also unaffected by executing gevalrvt and so (3.3.7) is proved. In fact, maintaining this property of the cobegin rule is one reason why we have placed communications operations in channels instead of in processes. The proof of (3.3.8) is similar to that of (3.3.6).
To prove (3.3.9), first observe that channel ~2 contains only one operation: r~2 ~--~,2 s~2. Thus, by applying the Decomposition Principle it is sufficient to prove {I} r12 ~---~,2 s12: (x := y) {I}.
The Locality Rule reduces this to {at(r~2) h at(s~2) A I}r12 ~'--~2 s12: (x := y) {after(r12) h after(s~2) A I} which follows directly from the GHL axiom for communication actions. The proof of (3.3.10) is similar to that of (3.3.9).
Other Methods
GHL can be used to reason about other interprocess communication mechanisms as well. For example, consider asynchronous message-passing, which can be viewed as a modification of CSP in which an output command ("!") does not wait for execution of a matching input command ("?"). In this case, the channel is a shared variable, rather than a program fragment. The asynchronous output command is an atomic operation to add a message to the channel and the corresponding input command is an atomic operation that removes a message.
The Decomposition Principle and GHL inference rules can be used to reduce the proof of invariance to elementary verification conditions, just as in the Owicki-Gries method. A proof method for programs that use such asynchronous message-passing is given in [19] . There, the state of the communications network is captured by using additional state variables (or D and PD), not unlike the way we have used at, in and after to capture the state of program counters. In general, it may be necessary to add such variables when axJkomatizing a programming construct.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have considered proof systems for reasoning about sharedmemory communication and for reasoning about the synchronous message passing of CSP. In so doing, we hope to have removed the mystery from this plethora of proof systems. Our thesis is that concurrent programs should be understood in terms of invariance. We believe that it is better to think of a concurrent program as an "invariance maintainer" than as a "predicate transformer". To that end, GHL, a simple formal system for reasoning about invariance, was developed.
Viewing proof methods in terms of invariance is not new. Many researchers have realized that different proof techniques resulted from different decompositions of a global invariant, an idea first expressed explicitly by Cousot and Cousot [3, 4] . In [5] , they suggested the decomposition of CSP programs into processes and channels. In contrast to the Cousots' work, which is based on program execution, our Decomposition Principle is based on syntactic decomposition of statements. It yields proof methods that are well suited to particular programming constructs.
The Decomposition Principle also suggests two principles for the design of a programming language. First, the syntactic components of the language should correspond to the logical components into which one decomposes a program when reasoning about it. The process construct is an example of such a syntactic component, processes being the logical components into which a program is decomposed when reasoning about a concurrent program. Secondly, the language should permit many properties of a program to follow naturally from the syntax. For example, the juxtaposition of statements sl and s2 denotes after(s1) ~ at(s2 ) in most programming notations.
Using GHL and the Decomposition Principle, which is really a meta-rule of GHL, it is possible to derive and compare other proof methods for reasoning about concurrent programs. Recent work of Cousot and Cousot [6] has shown that for any programming language in which flow of control can be expressed in terms of at, in, and after, GHL can be used to provide a sound and relatively complete axiom system for proving invariance properties. The at, in, and after predicates suffice to express the flow of control semantics in any concurrent programming language we know of. In addition, the Decomposition Principle provides useful insight for language designers.
